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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Professor Hari Osofsky1 is to be lauded for her efforts to expand the “geography” 
of international law and policy to encompass multiple levels of municipal, county, 
state, national, and international jurisdictions.2 She provides important insights into 
the nonformal collaborations that enhance the potential for subnational efforts to 
rein in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. My commentary builds on her insights, 
and presents some modest proposals on how to extend her analysis to encompass 
additional approaches to gain commitments to reducing GHG emissions. 
 Osofsky’s basic premise is that the “global” problem of climate change due to 
GHG emissions must be addressed on multiple levels, in large part because efforts at 
the international and national levels (of at least some countries) have fallen far short, 
and she expects this will continue. Cities—even small cities in suburban areas—need 
to make commitments to reduce GHG emissions within their jurisdictions. One 
could add to her argument the observation that jurisdictions at all levels can also 
attend to the other side of the GHG equation: maintaining or expanding forests to 
sequester carbon. Both reducing emissions and increasing carbon sequestration can 
be done through regulation, incentives, public works, and land purchases.
 Osofsky emphasizes that multilevel networks are crucial in providing the means 
to overcome the collective action problem. Her case study on the Minneapolis-Saint 
Paul metropolitan region demonstrates the remarkably complex arrangements, and is 
a very promising start to assessing the motivations and mechanisms for voluntary 
local actions (i.e., not mandated by state or federal rules) to reduce GHG emissions.
 In Part II of this essay I explore the implications of the potential incentives for 
greater action to address global climate change that go beyond the obvious moral 
imperative to encompass other value categories including wealth, well-being, and 
power. In Part III I address the consequences of the greater complexity of the system. 
In Part IV I present conclusions.
ii.  EXpLOring OthEr VaLUE CatEgOriEs: ghg EMissiOn rEdUCtiOns aLOng 
fOr thE ridE
 The set of values that can be tapped into may go beyond the values of rectitude 
(i.e., righteousness in conforming with ethical behavior) and respect (i.e., being held 
in high regard by others) that are assumed, if only implicitly, to be people’s primary 
motivations to reduce GHG emissions. Impulses can be categorized according to the 
Freudian distinctions of id, ego, and superego, which are roughly equivalent to raw 
impulse, instrumental reason, and conscience, respectively. One of the most insightful 
psychological aspects of the policy sciences framework is the “triple-appeal principle.” 
1. Hari M. Osofsky is a Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School; 2013–14 Fesler-Lampert 
Chair in Urban and Regional Affairs; Director of the Joint Degree Program in Law, Science & 
Technology; Faculty Member of the Conservation Biology Graduate Program; Adjunct Professor of the 
Department of Geography, Environment and Society; and Fellow of the Institute on the Environment. 
2. Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Solving Global Environmental Problems: Reflections on Polycentric 
Efforts to Address Climate Change, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 777 (2013–2014).
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That is, policy appeals can be based on any combination of id, ego, and superego.3 Of 
the three types of appeals, Osofsky’s essay (and the bulk of the writings on restraining 
GHG emissions) seems to emphasize the superego appeal rather than id or ego. In 
the spirit of conscience and altruism, Osofsky’s essay is framed in terms of 
opportunities and obstacles regarding cooperation rather than competition. To be 
sure, one can well imagine that “doing the right thing,” and gaining respect for doing 
so, may be the impulse that has moved some community leaders to embrace emission-
reduction measures. And the camaraderie of working with counterparts to establish 
these coalitions of altruists probably provides some affection rewards. Yet a fuller 
exploration of other value categories may be a useful next step toward discovering 
additional incentives for more jurisdictions to join these efforts, possibly based on 
well-being, wealth, and power.
 A. The Well-Being Value
 Let us first consider the well-being value, which entails health and physical 
security. For a small jurisdiction, reducing its own contribution to the global load of 
GHGs has no significant impact on the health of the local community. However, 
reducing automobile and factory emissions, because of the conventional pollutants 
they contain, could have significant health benefits. This could be accomplished 
through caps or higher taxes on these emissions.4 Concomitantly, some, but not all, 
means of reducing conventional air pollution entail reducing hydrocarbon combustion 
that produces GHG emissions. For example, a limit on the amount of sulfur dioxide 
(a conventional pollutant) that can be emitted would, in some circumstances, induce 
greater efficiency in the combustion of hydrocarbons, thus reducing GHG emissions. 
A switch to renewable power sources would similarly reduce conventional pollutants 
and GHG emissions.
 Requiring higher gas mileage in automobiles would also reduce both conventional 
pollutants and GHG emissions per mile driven. Impressive strides in reducing air 
pollution in the Los Angeles area have simultaneously reduced the consumption of 
hydrocarbon fuels and thereby the emission of GHGs.5 The substitution of liquid 
natural gas for diesel fuel for ships at the Los Angeles ports is projected to drastically 
reduce GHG emissions and virtually eliminate particulate emissions.6 Yet another 
example is the expansion of mass transit to reduce automobile use in general.
3. See Harold D. Lasswell, The Triple-Appeal Principle: A Contribution of Psychoanalysis to Political and Social 
Science, 37 Am. J. Soc. 523 (1932).
4. How large a community would have to be to benefit from a reduction in air pollution emissions from 
within its own boundaries varies according to numerous factors including, but not limited to, wind, its 
baseline pollution load, whether there is pollution from upwind area swamps, and the impact of 
internally generated pollution, etc.
5. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Transportation Energy Future Series: Potential for 
Energy Efficiency Improvement Beyond the Light-Duty-Vehicle Sector 64–67 (2013), 
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/55637.pdf.
6. See id. at 62 (“Ports, which tend to be high pollution areas, will strongly benefit from the CO2 [carbon 
dioxide] reductions, as well as from LNG’s [liquid natural gas’s] sulfur-free power, which eliminates 
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 Similarly, developing alternatives to driving, such as improved walkways or bike 
paths, can contribute to greater levels of exercise and thereby to reductions in the 
incidence of comorbidities to obesity, such as heart disease and diabetes.7 In Victoria, 
British Columbia, a study estimated that, in addition to considerable health 
improvements due to physical exercise, the monetized value of energy conservation is 
C$400 for each 1,000 miles walked, biked, or otherwise shifted to nonmotorized 
transport.8
 B. The Wealth Value
 Regarding the wealth value, if homebuyers and renters have sufficient information 
about the amenities that often come in tandem with a community’s efforts to reduce 
GHG emissions, it is possible that the property values (and thereby the tax base) of a 
community will increase along with its emission-reduction initiatives. This is 
especially true if (as discussed below) these initiatives include other community-
enhancing objectives that have the effect of reducing GHG emissions. Some of the 
same initiatives that improve health (well-being) can also enhance property values 
(increase wealth). For example, bike paths and improvements in “walkability”9 that 
enhance recreation can also increase the attractiveness of a neighborhood. A broad 
survey of research on bike trails in the United States found generally positive, though 
mild, increases in property values of homes near the trails.10 In their own more 
SOx [sulphur oxides]; [there will also be a] 90% reduction in NOx [nitrogen oxides] and [a] virtual 
elimination of PM [particulate matter].”). The nitrogen oxides, sulphur oxides, and particulates are 
conventional pollutants rather than greenhouse gases. Nitrogen oxides and sulphur oxides pose 
respiratory risks such as asthma and bronchitis. Both contribute to the formation of particulates; small 
particulates can penetrate deeply into the lungs, posing risks to both lung and heart health. See Alan 
H. Lockwood et al., Coal’s Assault on Human Health 2 (2009), available at http://www.psr.org/
assets/pdfs/psr-coal-fullreport.pdf (noting that nitrogen oxides, sulphur oxides, and the pollutants they 
give rise to pose the greatest health risks).
7. James F. Sallis, Robert B. Cervero, William Ascher, Karla A. Henderson, M. Katherine Kraft & 
Jacqueline Kerr, An Ecological Approach to Creating Active Living Communities, 27 Ann. Rev. Pub. 
Health 297, 303–04 (2006), available at http://www.rolandpark.org/documents/SallisEtAl.pdf.
8. Todd Litman, Quantifying the Benefits of Nonmotorized Transportation for Achieving 
Mobility Management Objectives 29 (2010), available at http://artshenkman.com/cs/groups/
content/@webottawa/documents/pdf/mdaw/mdy3/~edisp/con056214.pdf.
9. It is significant that Osofsky cites urban studies scholar Reid Ewing’s work on urban development and 
climate change. In other circles, Professor Ewing is deservedly prominent for his work on making cities 
more “walkable” for the sake of the physical health benefits from walking rather than riding in vehicles. 
See Reid Ewing et al., Identifying and Measuring Urban Design Qualities Related to Walkability, 3 J. 
Physical Activity & Health S223 (2006), available at http://activelivingresearch.org/files/
JPAH_15_Ewing.pdf.
10. See David P. Racca & Amardeep Dhanju, Project Report for Property Value/Desirability 
Effects of Bike Paths Adjacent to Residential Areas 11 (2006), available at http://128.175.63.72/
projects/DOCUMENTS/bikepathfinal.pdf (“The majority of studies indicate that the presence of a bike 
path/trail either increases property values and ease of sale slightly or has no effect. Studies have shown that 
neighbors of many bike paths/trails feel that the quality of life of their neighborhood has been improved, 
that the trails were a good use of open space, and in the case of abandoned railways were an improvement 
from before the trails went in. There is definitely a large portion of the population that sees bike paths as an 
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rigorous hedonic pricing estimate prepared for the Delaware Department of 
Transportation, policy analysts David P. Racca and Amardeep Dhanju found that 
the proximity to bike paths was associated with an $8,000 premium for the median 
$200,000 house in their sample.11
 Similarly, mass transit that relieves automobile congestion can increase property 
values. In Seoul, South Korea, auto traffic was reduced by dismantling an elevated 
highway and substituting it with dedicated bus lanes.12 This not only reduced 
pollution and the ambient temperature in the area, but also increased the value of 
buildings along the former highway.13
 C. The Power Value: Shifting from Cooperation to Competition 
 It is worth noting that efforts to attract home-buyer dollars are intrinsically 
competitive—communities compete with one another for those who can afford to 
pay more. The thrust of Osofsky’s efforts—and the bulk of the efforts addressing 
global climate change—have been focused on fostering cooperation rather than 
harnessing competition.14 The appeal to rectitude is a superego appeal to set aside 
one’s own pursuit of advantage for the sake of cooperating with the broader 
community. As laudable as voluntary cooperation may be, it is typically hampered by 
the collective action problem that provokes defections.15 The lack of cooperation on 
the part of national governments (e.g., the United States16) to require reductions in 
GHG emissions is an instance of defection from the international initiative to 
cooperate for the “selfish” interest of the citizenry of the country.
amenity and seeks out residences near trails, parks, and other natural resource areas. Some studies express 
that those recently moving into areas near bike paths are generally more favorable to the paths than those 
who have lived in neighborhoods before the construction of a trail. In some areas a large majority of 
neighbors are happy with the trails, even some who were originally opposed to their construction.”).
11. Id. at 21–22. “Hedonic pricing” is a pricing model that estimates the impact of a particular variable, 
such as proximity to a bike trail, by “predicting” the value of a dependent variable (such as housing 
prices) through a multiple regression model that includes the variable of interest and other variables that 
are believed to inf luence the dependent variable. The focus is then on the constant associated with the 
variable of interest: this constant (or parameter) represents the change in the dependent variable 
predicted by a unit change in the variable of interest, controlling for other, confounding variables. Thus, 
in the Racca and Dhanju study, being near a bike path “predicts” an $8,000 higher home price, 
controlling for variables such as size of house, age of house, and number of rooms, and so on. Id.
12. Robert Cervero, Urban Reclamation and Regeneration in Seoul, South Korea, in Physical Infrastructure 
Development: Balancing the Growth, Equity, and Environmental Imperatives 187, 190, 
192 (William Ascher & Corinne Krupp eds., 2010).
13. Id. at 195–96.
14. See Osofsky, supra note 2, at 815–19.
15. See id. at 781–83.
16. See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by 
Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 582, 627 
(2008).
864
Expanding thE “gEography” of policy options to rEducE ghg Emissions NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
 1. Voluntary Efforts
 Recognizing the potential for competition as a driving force for reductions in GHG 
emissions opens up a broader examination of civil society rankings and certifications as 
an element of “soft power” with potentially harsh economic consequences for weak 
compliance. Yale Law School professor Daniel Esty and Harvard Business School 
professor Michael Porter have developed an “Environmental Regulatory Regime 
Index” that can be used to make decisions on foreign direct investment or regional 
headquarters locations, thus affecting those locations’ competition for such investment.17
 The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certifies timber that has been harvested 
in a sufficiently sustainable way to meet the FSC’s standards, which are more 
stringent—and more outcome-oriented—than those of other standards.18 The FSC 
was founded by major environmental nongovernmental organizations after the failure 
of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit to spur action against deforestation. The absence of 
government involvement has allowed the FSC to take more aggressive stands in 
terms of sustainable forest management.19 The impact of FSC certification is that 
some manufacturers, retailers, and consumers will buy only FSC-certified lumber, 
putting timber operations that cannot gain certification at a competitive disadvantage, 
and possibly raising the concern of their governments.
 Note that the effectiveness of these efforts requires awareness of the certification 
and its virtues. In February 2008, the British marketing firm GfKNOP, commissioned 
by the FSC, found that only 23% of a random sample of British consumers recognized 
the FSC logo, though this was up from 19% in March 2007. Awareness of the FSC 
logo on paper products was only 9%.20 However, by 2011 another FSC survey found 
that 36% of British respondents recognized the FSC logo, up from 25% in 2010.21 
17. See Daniel C. Esty & Michael E. Porter, Ranking National Environmental Regulation and Performance: A 
Leading Indicator of Future Competitiveness?, in The Global Competitiveness Report 2001–2002, at 
78 (Michael Porter, Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner eds., 2002).
18. Other standards, such as the broadly used International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 14001 
standards, certify whether the company has an environmental management system, but do not entail 
independent monitoring of timber harvesting per se. Still other standards have been developed by the 
timber industries in various countries, and have generally been less stringent even if they do rely on 
monitoring timber harvesting. However, these other certification schemes have become increasingly 
rigorous as they have competed with the FSC for acceptance by retailers and consumers. See Christine 
Overdevest, Comparing Forest Certification Schemes: The Case of Ratcheting Standards in the Forest Sector, 8 
Socio-Econ. Rev. 47 (2010). 
19. Even so, the FSC also has its detractors for not being stringent enough: FSC Watch and Greenpeace 
International have criticized the FSC for weak custody records, certifying poor logging practices, and 
accrediting incompetent accrediting entities. See generally FSC Watch, http://www.fsc-watch.org/ (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2014); Greenpeace Int’l, Holding the Line with FSC: Recommendations and 
Progress to Date on Certification Body and FSC Performance Following a Critical 
Analysis of a Range of “Controversial” Certificates (2008), available at http://www.greenpeace.
org/france/PageFiles/266591/holdingtheline.pdf.
20. Forest Stewardship Council UK, Annual Report 2009–2010, at 12 (2010).
21. Forest Stewardship Council UK, Significant Increase in Awareness of FSC in the UK, GoForWood.info 
(Feb. 28, 2010), http://www.goforwood.info/en/news.php?id=29481. 
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Even so, many consumers likely do not know which stores carry FSC-certified 
products. In addition, wood products may be “certified” by programs of the timber 
industry that have far less rigid sustainability standards, and it is unlikely that many 
consumers would have the capacity to distinguish the rigorous FSC certifications 
from the others. In short, trying to harness competitive incentives through citizen 
cooperation has its limitations. Regulation would probably have greater impact.
 2. Regulatory Efforts
 On the global intergovernmental level, the pursuit of wealth through competitive 
trade has the potential to dovetail with reductions in GHG emissions, but 
governmental regulation may also be needed to draw out its competitive effect. This 
brings a focus on the looming battle between the need for stronger incentives to 
reduce GHG emissions and the benefits of free trade. On the one hand, a range of 
instruments exists to reduce the competitiveness of firms or nations that have more 
lax GHG emissions records, or more lax environmental standards in general. On the 
other hand, such instruments can be used as protectionism for less efficient domestic 
industries, reducing the benefits of free trade.
 There are four regulatory areas that can promote GHG emission reductions by 
impairing noncompliant firms or nations. First, a state can prohibit imports that do not 
meet the same environmental standards as those prevailing in the importing country or 
trading bloc. Several internationally endorsed standards exist, perhaps most prominently 
the environmental and energy conservation standards of the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO). After discussing the “reputational” advantages of a stringent 
environmental regime of a government wishing to enhance the partnership prospects 
with the European Union or specific EU nations, political scientists Kai Schulze and 
Jale Tosun assert that:
The second type of reward that the EU can provide to third states is access to 
its attractive markets, which is likely to trigger “trading-up” dynamics . . . . The 
trading-up argument suggests that high-regulating jurisdictions may use 
environmental standards to restrict or even ban noncompliant imports. Such 
market access regulations therefore represent an economic incentive for third 
countries that wish to export goods to a high-regulating market to conform to 
that market’s standards. In this perspective, the green markets of the EU can 
act as regulatory price makers, thereby compelling third states to follow 
European provisions. Failure to comply might result in punishment through 
import restrictions . . . . The trading-up argument has been widely confirmed 
in the literature with respect to both product and production process standards.22
 Second, a state can favor nations (i.e., “most favored nation” trade status) with 
superior environmental regulations, in some instances by entering into multilateral 
environmental agreements. Schulze and Tosun “contend that the trading-up mechanism 
22. Kai Schulze & Jale Tosun, External Dimensions of European Environmental Policy: An Analysis of 
Environmental Treaty Ratification by Third States, 52 Eur. J. Pol. Res. 581, 585 (2013). See generally 
Frank Schimmelfennig, Europeanisation Beyond the Member States, 8 J. Comp. Gov’t & Eur. Pol’y 319 
(2010); Daniel W. Drezner, The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion, 57 Int’l Org. 643 (2003).
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is also powerful enough to induce third states to join the EU’s preferred MEAs 
[Multilateral Environmental Agreements].”23 In their analysis of the likelihood that a 
non-EU nation would enter into a multilateral environmental agreement with the EU, 
they find that “the prospect of gaining access to the highly regulated and lucrative 
markets of the EU can produce an incentive for third countries to align their 
environmental regulations with EU norms.”24
 Third, a state can impose Pigovian taxes,25 such as a carbon tax, on imports from 
nations that do not have such taxes, thereby causing the GHG-profligate firms to 
internalize the cost of excessive GHG emissions. Several European leaders have 
pressed for an EU-wide carbon tax on imports; thus far it has been resisted by the 
corporate sector and other European leaders.26
 Fourth, a state can impose antidumping restrictions on nations with less stringent 
regulations, on the grounds that lax environmental regulations reduce the costs of 
production, and therefore constitute dumping.27 Economists Marius Brülhart and 
Alan Matthews note:
The imposition of anti-dumping measures is permitted under WTO rules, if 
dumping “causes or threatens material injury to an established industry . . . or 
materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.” Complex pricing 
policies and adjustment for indirect cost factors leave a degree of arbitrariness 
in the calculation of dumping margins and “material injury.” WTO rules also 
permit countries to take countervailing action against exports which have 
benefited from subsidies in the exporting country provided such exports cause 
or threaten to cause material injury to a domestic industry.28
23. Schulze & Tosun, supra note 22, at 585. 
24. Id. at 596. Their analysis is based on the premise that nations more dependent on EU trade are more 
likely to enter into these agreements, controlling for other factors that might inf luence the motivation to 
enter into such an agreement.
25. A Pigovian tax is a tax that is imposed on a negative externality, such as pollution, that is generated by 
economic activity. See generally Environmental Policy and Pigouvian Taxation, Tax Found., http://
taxfoundation.org/tax-topics/environmental-policy-and-pigouvian-taxation (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
26. See, e.g., Scheherazade Daneshkhu, Sarkozy Fights to Save Flagship Carbon Tax, Fin. Times, Dec. 31, 2009. 
(noting that Nicolas Sarkozy’s efforts to enact a carbon tax on imports in France and in the European 
Union as a whole were opposed by the Socialist Party within France and by the German government); Ben 
Hall, Recovery Fears Spur Sarkozy Attack on ‘Currency Disorder’, Fin. Times, Jan. 8, 2010.
27. Technical Information on Anti-Dumping, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2014) (“Dumping is, in general, a situation of international 
price discrimination, where the price of a product when sold in the importing country is less than the 
price of that product in the market of the exporting country. Thus, in the simplest of cases, one identifies 
dumping simply by comparing prices in two markets. However, the situation is rarely, if ever, that 
simple, and in most cases it is necessary to undertake a series of complex analytical steps in order to 
determine the appropriate price in the market of the exporting country (known as the ‘normal value’) 
and the appropriate price in the market of the importing country (known as the ‘export price’) so as to 
be able to undertake an appropriate comparison.”).
28. Marius Brülhart & Alan Matthews, EU External Trade Policy, in The European Union: Economics 
& Policies 473, 481 (Ali M. El-Agraa ed., 8th ed. 2007) (emphasis added).
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All of these approaches would either favor nations and firms with more responsible 
GHG practices, or offset the existing competitive advantages of nations and firms 
with profligate practices.
 However, regulatory intervention can also lead countries to adopt instruments that 
block imports in order to protect domestic industries. The many decades of free-trade 
efforts through the negotiating rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
and the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enforce the agreements 
against tariffs and nontariff barriers, therefore challenge these instruments. The most 
commonly articulated concern is that invoking environmental standards to justify 
nontariff barriers would be used as pretexts for protecting domestic industry.29
 Another concern is that banning imports that lack certification would disadvantage 
firms of developing countries because of the rather stiff costs of gaining and maintaining 
certification. Consider, for example, the costs of the aforementioned ISO standards, 
which are the most internationally prominent environmental practices certifications. 
ISO 14001 certification requires a firm to develop an environmental management 
system entailing mechanisms to trace the environmental impacts of its activities and 
outputs, assess its environmental performance, comply with environmental laws and 
regulations, and demonstrate continual environmental improvement.30 The formal 
certification requires review and approval by a third party that has been qualified to 
undertake the certification review. In 2004, William Glasser of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency estimated that “large facilities spend on average about $1 million in 
sunk transaction costs to pursue certification.”31 Among developing countries, some 
would also have great advantage over others. China is currently in a stronger position 
to move toward meeting more stringent GHG emission standards than many other 
developing countries. China has already installed more wind power than the United 
States; China’s hard-currency reserves could finance the importation of alternative 
energy components to complement domestic technology and equipment; and Chinese 
research and development manufacturing clusters32 have been impressively gearing up 
29. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Harris, Trade and the Environment: A GDAE Teaching Module on 
Social and Environmental Issues in Economics 12 (2004) (“WTO authorities tend to be 
suspicious of ‘green protectionism’—the use of trade barriers to protect domestic industry from 
competition under the guise of environmental regulation.”).
30. Int’l Org. for Standardization, ISO 14001—Environmental Management Systems—Requirements with 
Guidance for Use (2004).
31. Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Racing to the Bottom? Trade, Environmental Governance, and ISO 
14001, 50 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 350, 352 (2006) (quoting a 2004 e-mail from William Glasser, U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency).
32. These are facilities that undertake research and development for new products and processes, 
complimentary to and usually clustered in close proximity to facilities that manufacture the new 
products, use the newly developed processes, or both. See, e.g., Douglas Zhihua Zeng, How Do Special 
Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters Drive China’s Rapid Development, in Building Engines for 
Growth and Competitiveness in China: Experience with Special Economic Zones and 




Expanding thE “gEography” of policy options to rEducE ghg Emissions NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
to use alternative energy. The question, though, is whether this ought to be seen as 
lamentable, for the sake of India, Bangladesh, Haiti, and other developing nations 
without deep pockets, or as an opportunity to lower GHG emissions by inducing 
Chinese firms and the Chinese government to accept more stringent emissions 
standards as a competitive advantage over such other developing nations. In a sense, 
the question is whether global climate change is dire enough to warrant greater 
inequality in the wealth of nations.
 In addition, some analysts question the efficiency of import restrictions, even if 
they are sound in terms of excluding imports produced in environmentally problematic 
ways. Brülhart and Matthews argue that: 
The main trade policy issue in [the environmental] debate relates to the use of 
import restrictions on goods whose production creates negative transborder 
environmental externalities. Economic theory suggests that in such circumstances 
the most efficient remedy is to apply direct environmental policy at the source of 
the externality (e.g., through pollution taxes, eco-subsidies or regulation . . . ). 
However, environmental policies are often difficult to enforce, so this first-best 
option may not be feasible. In that case, import restrictions may be the only 
practicable policy tool. The main drawback of import restrictions against 
polluting countries is that they provide protection to domestic producers of the 
importable good, and ecological arguments are therefore vulnerable to abuse by 
domestic protectionist lobbies. For this reason, trade measures should be 
temporary and accompanied by efforts to implement environmental policies in 
the polluting countries. Even if the externalities are dealt with by environmental 
policies adopted at the source, new problems can still emerge. Environmental 
policies affect the competitiveness of open economies. Thus, countries with lax 
environmental legislation are blamed for “ecological dumping,” and import-
competing industries in countries with stringent laws may lobby for protection 
to ensure a “level playing field” . . . . Even if an agreed way of eradicating 
“ecological dumping” could be found, it remains questionable if trade restrictions 
are the most appropriate remedy. Restricting imports can be counterproductive 
as it promotes the domestic activities which the environmental policy is 
attempting to restrain.33
Brülhart and Matthews conclude that:
Trade policy is certainly not the best, and can often be an inappropriate, 
instrument to protect the environment. International dialogue and agreed 
domestic policy measures are a more efficient alternative. The main platform 
for such negotiations is the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, 
which was established in 1995. Discussions in this committee have so far been 
a mere stocktaking exercise, and its reports rarely contained specific proposals. 
The EU, like everybody else, supports the case for multilateral environmental 
agreements, but the difficulty lies in getting countries to agree.34
33. Brülhart & Matthews, supra note 28, at 489–90. 
34. Id. at 490.
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Here again, the emphasis has been on fostering cooperation rather than harnessing 
competition. As the consequences of global climate change become more acute, the 
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment will likely come under increasing 
pressure to acknowledge the global costs of not permitting import restrictions based 
on GHG emissions.
 One possibility is requiring ISO certification for imports into countries that also 
require ISO certification for domestically produced goods. The ISO (which China 
joined in 1997), has very recently formulated the certification standards for energy 
use—ISO 50001.35 Like the ISO 14001 standards cited above,36 the ISO 50001 
certification requires a management plan, mechanisms to trace energy use and its 
impacts, a system for monitoring progress, and demonstration of continued progress. 
While the initiative, first begun by the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, 
has been led by the U.S. and Brazilian delegations, China has also been very active. 
And the ISO’s environmental standards, first promulgated in 1996, do have “carbon 
footprint” and GHG reduction as part of the suite of management goals and criteria: 
ISO 14064 provides for quantification, monitoring, and reporting of GHG emissions,37 
and ISO 14067 provides a framework for measuring the carbon footprint.38 Although 
the forestry standards have been criticized as insufficiently rigorous,39 and compliance 
is often an issue,40 the general assessment of the impact of ISO environmental standards 
has been quite positive. Thousands of firms have adopted ISO standards, and have 
35. Int’l Org. for Standardization, ISO 50001—Energy Management Systems—Requirements with Guidance 
for Use (2011).
36. ISO 14001—Environmental Management Systems—Requirements with Guidance for Use, supra note 30.
37. Int’l Org. for Standardization, ISO 14064—Greenhouse Gases—Accounting and Verification (2006). 
38. Int’l Org. for Standardization, ISO 14067—Greenhouse Gases—Carbon Footprint of Products—Requirements 
and Guidelines for Quantification and Communication (2013).
39. See generally Jennifer Clapp, ISO Environmental Standards: Industry’s Gift to a Polluted Globe or the 
Developed World’s Competition-Killing Strategy?, in Yearbook of International Co-operation on 
Environment and Development 27 (Olav Schram Stokke & Øystein B. Thommessen eds., 2001). 
First, ISO standards are weak in that they pertain to the quality of the environmental management 
systems that firms report that they have established, but not on actual performance. Second, the ISO 
environmental standards are directed at firms and their products, not at the upstream processes that 
provide inputs for those firms. Therefore, the volume of greenhouse emissions of energy sources 
(electricity, hydrocarbon fuels, etc.), raw materials, agricultural inputs, etc., are not captured in the ISO 
certification criteria. Because a large proportion of China’s GHG emissions are produced by “upstream” 
activities such as energy generation, mining, and raw-material processing, a manufacturing firm’s 
environmental management system will not incorporate the volume of emissions of these activities. 
Third, some firms that receive certification nevertheless f launt environmental regulations because of 
weak inspection by government agencies.
40. Haitao Yin & Chunbo Ma, International Integration: A Hope for a Greener China?, 26 Int’l Marketing 
Rev. 348, 348 (2009) (“[I]nternational trade does gear up the adoption of ISO 14001 standards in 
China through increasing pressures from international green customers. However, our analyses suggest 
that the adoption of ISO 14001 certification does not necessarily improve firms’ compliance with 
existing environmental regulations in China. The actual impact depends on how stringently [an] 
environmental agency carries out inspections. We also find that in China, ISO 14001 certification 
motivates little, if any, environmental performance improvement beyond bottom-line environmental 
regulations.”).
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required their suppliers to do the same, despite the higher costs that one might imagine 
would be competitively disadvantageous.41
 One could imagine that governments wishing to make ISO standards stringent 
enough to develop a broad approach to reducing GHG emissions could also be 
motivated by a desire to pose barriers to entry to competitors in other countries. This 
could be done by establishing performance standards requiring the reduction of 
GHG emissions, and specifying how to monitor and assess whether these standards 
are being met. More stringent standards could also require the exclusive use of inputs 
produced with relatively low emissions. Ensuring that management systems or actual 
performance criteria reflect the incorporation of a realistic carbon tax would, perhaps, 
capture the “carbon cost” of securing inputs entailing high GHG emissions. The 
competitive advantage of gaining ISO certification, if other firms or nations cannot, 
may provide adequate incentive for governments to adopt a carbon tax system, and 
overcome the current technical difficulties of assigning the carbon tax burdens where 
they are appropriate.
 The obstacles to adopting considerably more stringent ISO standards begin with 
the ISO’s decisionmaking process. The ISO’s so-called “consensus process” requires 
a super-majority of two-thirds of the participating members of the relevant technical 
committee and subcommittee (comprised of representatives of national standards 
organizations), and no more than a quarter of the votes cast can be negative votes.42 
However, the bulk of the ISO technical committees have fewer than forty 
“participating members,” and the average is roughly thirty, which means that the 
crucial technical work, and the voting, is dominated by the nations with the expertise 
and resources to qualify as “participating members.” Environmental law scholar 
Stepan Wood argues that the developing countries have far less clout in the ISO 
than the apparently equitable processes seem to imply. He reports that over 90% of 
the leadership of the more than 2,000 technical working groups is made up of 
members from developed countries.43 Yet China ranks highest, and is the only 
developing country among the top ten countries that hold the most committee and 
subcommittee secretariats.44
41. See generally Prakash & Potoski, supra note 31; Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Investing Up: FDI 
and the Cross-Country Diffusion of ISO 14001 Management Systems, 51 Int’l Stud. Q. 723 (2007); 
Andrew B. Whitford & Justin A. Tucker, Focal Points in Public Policy: Evidence from Voluntary Regulation, 
29 Rev. Pol’y Res. 281 (2012).
42. See Stages of the Development of International Standards, Int’l Org. for Standardization, http://www.
iso.org/iso/home/standards_development/resources-for-technical-work/stages_of_the_development_
of_international_standards.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
43. Stepan Wood, The International Organization for Standardization, in Business Regulation and Non-
State Actors: Whose Standards? Whose Development? 81, 90 (Darryl Reed et al. eds., 2012).
44. Id.
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iii. thE EVEn grEatEr COMpLEXitY Of thE sYstEM
 Osofsky uses the images, popularized by Nobel-prize-winning political scientist 
Elinor Ostrom, of “concentric circles” and “nested systems.”45 These are useful 
images to convey the connections from the very local to the very global. However, 
they can be quite misleading: the Russian doll image of one jurisdiction embedded 
neatly in a larger one misses the reality of overlapping and crisscrossing authorities 
involved in overseeing the different but connected issues mentioned above, such as 
conventional pollution, transportation, physical activity promotion, forestry, and 
trade, just to name a few.
 For example, there are bilateral intergovernmental international organizations 
that are not embedded within nearly global international organizations like the United 
Nations or WTO. The U.S.-Canadian Great Lakes International Joint Commission 
is concerned with, among other things, acidification and other aspects of water quality 
of the Great Lakes. Even subnational entities—states and provinces—hold positions 
as members of such bodies as the Great Lakes Water Quality Board.46 The mission 
statement of the Joint Commission very clearly recognizes the potential for conflict 
over shared ecological systems: “The International Joint Commission prevents and 
resolves disputes between the United States of America and Canada under the 1909 
Boundary Waters Treaty.”47
 Although the Russian doll model presumes that governance below the state level 
would be under the state government, there are governance authorities below the 
state level tied to counterpart authorities in bordering states that do not report to 
state governments. The Susquehanna River Basin Commission, which oversees the 
watershed management of the New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland areas f lowing 
into the Susquehanna River, has a commissioner for each state and a federal 
commissioner as well.48
 On an even lower jurisdictional level, some border-county authorities do not 
report to the county governments or to the state in which the counties are located. For 
example, the North Coast Unified Air Quality Management District is a regional 
environmental regulatory agency with jurisdiction over Humboldt, Del Norte, and 
Trinity counties in Northern California.49 This regional agency can enact regulations 
apart from the regulations formulated by the State of California.
45. See generally Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action passim (1990).
46. See Members, Great Lakes Water Quality Bd., http://ijc.org/en_/wqb/Members (last visited Mar. 
27, 2014).
47. IJC Mission and Mandates, Int’l Joint Comm’n, http://www.ijc.org/en_/IJC_Mandates (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2014).
48. See Susquehanna River Basin Commission Overview, Susquehanna River Basin Comm’n, http://www.
srbc.net/about/geninfo.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
49. See District Information, N. Coast Unified Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., http://www.ncuaqmd.org/
index.php?page=district.info (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
872
Expanding thE “gEography” of policy options to rEducE ghg Emissions NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
 Finally, on the most “micro” level, many cities have multineighborhood associations 
that do not include all neighborhoods within the city. For example, Binford 
Redevelopment and Growth, comprised of certain Indianapolis neighborhoods, is an 
initiative that coordinates the redevelopment efforts of several neighborhood 
organizations.50
 Moreover, the governance picture is even more complicated by the existence of 
both nongovernmental organizations and collaborations between governmental and 
nongovernmental entities. For the mixed collaborations, we need only note that, at 
the global level, nearly all global nongovernmental organizations may nonetheless 
have national-government agencies among their members. The ISO is in fact a 
nongovernmental organization,51 in which the national standards bureaus comprise 
only part of its membership. However, unlike formal intergovernmental international 
organizations such as the WTO, World Bank, or International Monetary Fund, 
ultimate authority over ISO decisions is not held by representatives of nation-state 
governments. The World Energy Council also has a mix of governmental and 
nongovernmental member organizations, numbering more than 3,000, with a strong 
commitment to developing research and policies for energy sustainability.
iV. COnCLUsiOns
 The examples brief ly summarized above demonstrate the complexity of both 
institutional arrangements and potential motivations that, in principle, could be 
harnessed to make greater progress in addressing global climate change. The 
arrangements are not confined to just local, just national, or just international 
interactions; the dizzying array of mixed forms provides many nodes of environmental 
governance to address problems on multiple scales. This opens up opportunities to 
50. See Binford Redevelopment & Growth, http://www.binford71.org/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
51. Structure and Governance, Int’l Org. for Standardization, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/
about_governance.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2014) (“ISO is an independent, non-governmental 
organization made up of members from the national standards bodies of 161 countries. Our members 
play a vital role in how we operate, meeting once a year for a General Assembly that decides our strategic 
objectives.”). ISO national members typically have, in turn, governmental agencies among their member 
organizations. For example, the member entity of the United States, the American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI), includes the National Institute of Standards and Technology within the Department 
of Commerce, along with more than fifty other governmental entities including city police departments, 
county departments, state-level agencies, and other federal agencies, but also hundreds of corporations, 
hundreds of professional associations and business associations, some academic institutions, and even 
over forty international non-U.S. members. See ISO Members, Int’l Org. for Standardization, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/iso_members.htm?membertype=membertype_MB (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2014); United States (ANSI), Int’l Org. for Standardization, http://www.iso.org/iso/
home/about/iso_members/iso_member_body.htm?member_id=2188 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 
Argentina’s member entity, the Instituto Argentino de Normalización y Certificación (IRAM), “is a 
private non-profit body. Founded in 1935, it became a legal entity in 1937 and was shortly afterwards 
granted recognition by the Government as the Central Organization for the technical and scientific 
study of standards, with the object of developing and maintaining uniformity of systems and criteria.” 
See Argentina (IRAM), Int’l Org. for Standardization, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/iso_
members/iso_member_body.htm?member_id=1520 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). It also has member 
organizations of government, industry, and technical associations. See id.
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develop coalitions of the willing across conventional boundaries. Yet the complexity of 
arrangements also provides the opportunity for governmental and nongovernmental 
actors to compete for well-being, wealth, power, and other values; this competition 
can be destructive, as the race to energy-intensive industrialization has become, but 
the key question is whether competition for such values can be harnessed to reverse 
this trend. The potential incentives for addressing the rise of GHG emissions are far 
less limited in scope than the conventional framing of “do the right thing” would 
imply. While the moral imperative of addressing global climate change is certainly 
compelling, other motives must be harnessed, even if they are not as self-sacrificing as 
the spirit of international cooperation would call for. As the weakness of international 
agreements to reduce GHG emissions, such as the Kyoto Protocol,52 have demonstrated, 
cooperation, and the underlying appeal to rectitude, has not borne ample fruit. We 
need to harness the competitive spirit; on the local level, as communities discover that 
being green can raise property values and attract wealthier residents; to the 
international level, where governments may be induced to make GHG emission 
regulations more stringent in order to squeeze out competition. At some point—
perhaps now—painful competition will have to be utilized to save the planet.
52. See generally Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005).
